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Africa arguably faces the biggest threat to political stability since the collapse 
of colonialism in the mid-twentieth 
century. The militancy of Al-Qaeda 
in Islamic Maghreb, Boko Haram in 
north-eastern Nigeria, Al-Shabaab in 
Somalia, the al-Mulathameen Brigade 
(the “Masked Ones”) in Algeria, Ansar 
al-Dine in Mali, Séléka in the Central 
African Republic and Ansar al-Sharia 
in Tunisia, among others, strike at the 
heart of African cohesion and nation-
building.1 
The growth of this militancy feeds off 
the profile of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula and elsewhere and more 
recently the declaration of a caliphate 
by the ‘Islamic State’ in Syria and the 
Levant (ISIS/ISIL). Reacting to last year’s 
brutal beheading of American and 
French hostages in Syria and Algeria 
and subsequent Islamic militant attacks 
in Paris and elsewhere, the West sees 
the growth of Islamic extremism in the 
Arabian Peninsula, the Middle East 
and Europe as a direct threat to the 
Euro-American-centred understanding 
of global coherence. By contrast, the 
hostage-taking of over 200 girls in 
Chibok on the night of 14-15 April 
2014 and subsequent events resulted, 
at best, in a restrained response by the 
West (as well as by the Nigerian state). 
In the absence of a compromise between the 
two ends of Africa’s economic divide, the very 











om Journalists, analysts and scholars 
provide crucial insights into the identity 
and praxis of Africa’s rebel groups. 
Credible information is, however, 
invariably a casualty of war. This means 
that unbiased insights into the African 
conflict necessitate a high level of critical 
thoughtfulness. The consequences of 
the support by the West for oppressive 
African regimes needs close scrutiny. 
Strident Muslim aggression needs, in 
turn, to be understood in relation to the 
influence of western-based Christian 
fundamentalist groups in Africa, 
which many devout Muslim believers 
see as a muted form of the Christian 
crusades that endured for 200 years. 
Eight hundred years later, the current 
conflict is understood by them as a 
continuing fight for the purity of an 
Islamic belief, against which defeat is 
for them not an option. 
There is a need to unravel the 
underlying affinity with, and popular 
support for, specific rebel groups, as 
well as the periodic tensions that exist 
within rebel groups in the Maghreb, 
Sahel and Central Africa. This involves 
situations in Somalia, for example, 
where Al-Shabaab pursues a nationalist 
struggle (requiring the support of 
people with different needs and 
interests) while appropriating a global 
Islamic agenda. The extent of this 
dual agenda provides insights into the 
potential limitations and possibilities 
of a continental fight-back against the 
dominant Euro-American influence 
in African countries and the quest for 
individual national objectives. 
There are at least five key elements 
that are fundamental to understanding 
the jihadist conflicts in Africa.
Euro-American global dominance 
Current fundamentalist Islamic 
assertions can be traced back to the 
1648 Treaty of Westphalia, established 
in the wake of the thirty year ‘religious 
war’ in Europe. The Treaty failed to 
hold, with periodic wars and eventually 
the eruption of the Napoleonic Wars 
(1803 -1815) that ravaged Europe. This 
was followed by the 1815 Concert of 
Europe, an attempt to (again) forge 
stability under ‘great power’ control. 
European expansionism had, in the 
meantime, already extended into the 
‘new world’ by the end of the fifteenth 
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century, characterised by Columbus’s 
epic voyage in 1492. Vasco da Gama, 
in turn, sailed around the Cape of Good 
Hope in 1497 opening a new trade 
route between European countries and 
India. In 1858 direct British rule was 
established in India, the Anglo-Chinese 
opium wars were under way, and other 
European nations occupied territory 
in the region. In 1884-85 the Berlin 
Conference formalised the carving up 
of Africa by European countries. 
In an attempt to re-establish world 
order in the wake of the World War 
l and the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire, the Sykes-Picot agreement 
of 1916 placed Iraq, Transjordan and 
Palestine under British protection. 
Syria and Lebanon were placed under 
French control. Egypt in the meantime 
remained under British rule, and 
France controlled the Maghreb. Arab 
nationalists and radical Islamic groups 
fought back against colonialism. In 
1948 the West further prioritised the 
protection of the newly established 
state of Israel and, ironically, oversaw 
the birth of Salafism and jihadism in 
the marriage between Saudi tribalism 
and Wahhabist theology.2 
In Africa, British and French 
colonialists were determined to see the 
birth of moderate, pro-western states in 
the wake of the independence struggle 
in the 1950s and 1960s, while the Cold 
War impacted on the independence 
process. The net outcome was a 
plethora of African coups d’etat and 
counter coups, with dominant western 
states supporting their client states in 
quashing rebel groups. This ideological 
conflict soon mutated into resource 
wars and economic deprivation, 
manipulated by religion and culture, 
which are still prevalent today. 
This continuing ideological 
underpinning of opposing groups 
in Africa indicates the need for a 
deeper understanding of the conflict 
between rebel groups and existing 
African governments. It requires more 
than military engagement to persuade 
rebels to lay down their arms. African 
governments and their global partners 
need to accept that the manipulation 
of religion, culture and material 
resources, as a basis for the survival 
of current African governments, is 
both counter-productive and futile. 
It also requires groups committed to 
exclusivist forms of Sharia to explore 
options for co-existence with people of 
other faiths and persuasions.
The absence of a peaceful 
resolution to this contestation provides 
a gap within which jihadism and 
other quests for potential domination 
thrive, highlighting the need for a new 
paradigm for global coexistence to end 
the conflict. Karl Marx warned that 
“the tradition of all dead generations 
weighs like a nightmare on the brain 
of the living”.3 The obligation of each 
generation is to remember and to 
engage with the past as a basis for 
creating a new future. 
The African State 
The ability of Africa to overcome 
a history of conflict, linked as it is to 
the history of colonialism and the 
internalisation of power relations by 
successive independent Africa states 
raises questions concerning the nature 
of the African state. 
Basil Davidson argues that the 
assumption that state boundaries 
in Africa ought to coincide with 
cultural boundaries is “the curse 
of the nation state”.4 It is also an 
underlying dimension of divisions and 
under-development in regions within 
African states, notably in the under-
development of north-east Nigeria, 
in the eastern parts of the DRC, in 
the northern regions of Uganda and 
elsewhere. 
African states have their roots in 
colonial law, which resulted in a situation 
of political control by a dominant group. 
This “crime”, says Mahmood Mamdani, 
resulted in the politicisation of culture, 
religion and indigeneity, to the exclusion 
of subservient and minority groups. 
Africa’s continued failure to adequately 
address the racial, ethnic, cultural, 
religious and economic divisions of 
the state provides fertile ground within 
which rebel groups prosper in African 
states.5 
This encourages cross-border 
alliances between allied groups, as 
evidenced in Boko Haram’s support in 
Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroon. 
It is also seen in the attacks by 
Al-Shabaab into the disputed Ogden 
territory and deeper into Kenya – 
attacks undertaken with the noticeable 
support of alienated Kenyan nationals 
who choose to designate themselves 
as ‘Somalians’. There is, at the same 
time, also evidence of this cross-border 
activity resulting in tensions between 
rebel groups in defence of their specific 
areas of operation. This has resulted in 
reports of Al-Qaeda amir, Abdelmalek 
Droukdel, admonishing AQIM regional 
commanders to explore flexible forms 
of co-operation with Al-Shabaab in 
Somalia, Kenya and elsewhere on the 
continent.6
Class Conflict 
Capitalism has produced a 
dependent African economy, and 
African experiments with Marxist-
inspired socialism have shown 
themselves incapable of inspiring 
growth and development. 
The challenge is to create an African 
economy in pursuit of self-sufficiency, 
capable of rising above dependency 
on American, European and growing 
Chinese trade. The extent of organised 
labour in most countries remains largely 
ineffective, resulting in a capitalist class 
that is largely unchallenged by the 
broader community, although this is 
slowly changing in some African states.
A minority of grassroots Africans 
have been drawn into middle and 
upper classes which, in the words 
of Steven Friedman, constitute an 
exclusive club “never meant to be for 
everyone.”7 In situations where an 
increasing number of impoverished 
young people are supportive of rebel 
groups, the conflict between rich and 
poor is invariably decided through 
rebellion, class warfare and terrorism. 
In the absence of a compromise 
between the two ends of Africa’s 
economic divide, the very fabric of 
African coexistence is under serious 
threat. 
The question is whether African 
leaders and their sponsors have the 
political will and economic savvy, let 
alone the moral integrity, to negotiate 
the required economic compromise. 
Robert Rotberg outlines the parameters 
of the global economy within which this 
compromise needs to be negotiated: 
“The centre-periphery structure of global 
politics places strain on developing 
economies that makes it extremely 
difficult for Africans to develop fully 
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in the market place dominated by 
first world economies, which have 
effectively been built and maintained 
in a colonial-economic relationship 
with Africa. This reaches to the heart 
of the under-development in Africa, 
from which individual African states are 
seeking to liberate themselves.8 
Religion as a national and global 
phenomenon 
African poverty acts in a symbiotic 
relationship with religion, with religion 
being a powerful mobilising force 
among grassroots communities. 
Priests, mullahs, rabbis and other 
religious leaders are frequently 
associated with the negative forces 
that terrorise the world through the 
use of religious language and symbols 
that acquire apocalyptic dimensions. 
This interpretation of religion demands 
dogmatic obedience by its followers, 
accompanied by visions of rewards 
in heaven. There are, at the same 
time, inspirational religious leaders 
and grassroots believers in Islam and 
Christianity who affirm the supremacy 
of God and Allah over state and rebel 
leaders. 
Focus on the pre-eminence of the 
divine in political conflict is a critical 
theological principle, largely suppressed 
in the captivity of institutional religion to 
the dogma of ruling and rebel groups, 
which lifts the political conflict into the 
realm of ultimate (spiritual) encounters 
between rebels and the state. Driven 
by different forms of propaganda, 
this promotes and legitimises the 
engagement of believers in the 
massacre of civilians, the kidnapping 
and abduction of people, the raping 
of women and girls, forced marriages 
and the killing of infidels and apostates 
– as well as the slaughter of rebels by 
government forces. 
The extent of this violence, driven by 
a sense of exclusivity, moral superiority, 
religious intensity and blind submission 
to authority has resulted in the endemic 
demonisation and dehumanisation of 
‘the other’ – whether Christian, Muslim 
or simply people who are indifferent 
to the prevailing conflict. This is seen 
in the escalation of conflicts across 
the continent, including the religious 
war between Séléka and anti-Balaka 
that engulfs ‘politically uninvolved’ 
by-standers in the Central African 
Republic. 
Dehumanisation of the other 
The extent of rebel atrocities are 
responded to with government violence 
of similar magnitude, as evidenced in 
the call by Amnesty International for 
senior military officers in Nigeria to 
be investigated for the way in which 
they responded to the activities of 
Boko Haram rebel groups; and some 
spokespersons for government forces 
openly advocate and defend violence 
as the ‘only solution’ to the conflict, 
which draws on a range of both 
religious and secular forces. 
Contemporary rebel groups draw 
on religious and cultural ideas that 
feed off the origins of earlier cultural 
and religious traditions and historic 
movements.  In so doing, they have 
lifted the conflict into the realm of 
spiritual encounter in their conflict 
with the state.9 Boko Haram draws on 
the memory of Mai Tatsine, literally the 
‘people who curse’, in their fight for 
an independent Nigerian Islamic state; 
Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb emerged 
as an armed Islamic group fighting 
against a secular state in Algeria; al 
Shabaab began as a military wing of 
the Somali Council of Islamic Courts; 
and in the Central African Republic 
Séléka and anti-Balaka are rooted in 
contemporary forms of a Muslim and 
Christian community-driven war. 
Marginalisation, exclusion, 
desperation and the absence of 
political alternatives in the face of 
uncompromising state military power, 
lead to a combination of political 
reactions, religious extremism and 
violence. These responses, fuelled 
by abject poverty in the face of elitist 
economic wealth and authoritarian 
power, have produced a toxic mix of 
anger. Needing to be  fully dissected 
and comprehensively analysed, the 
origins of the capacity of these and 
other rebel groups to resort to human 
terror need to be understood as a 
basis for discerning alternative options 
for countering the dehumanisation of 
Africans and indeed of humanity itself. 
There are no quick answers to 
questions central to the threat posed 
by rebel groups to specific African 
states, often supported by regional 
and global powers. These and related 
alliances need to be placed under 
the microscope of a pool of multi-
disciplinary analysts with a view to 
addressing the intertwined causes 
of the conflict embedded in Africa’s 
stubborn conflict. Thabo Mbeki, writing 
on the 2011 popular uprisings in Africa 
as seen in the African Maghreb and 
Egypt, asks a pertinent question that 
is equally relevant to the proliferation 
of rebel groups elsewhere on the 
continent: “Where are the African 
intelligentsia, whose task it is to narrate 
accurately what is unfolding [on the 
continent]?” he asks. His call is for an 
analysis and narrative that “might serve 
truly to advance the Africa democratic 
revolution and therefore the African 
Renaissance.”10 If analysts and scholars 
in African and other countries, together 
with regional and global agencies, fail 
to embrace this responsibility the 
(much heralded) economic progress in 
particular African countries is likely to 
be engulfed in an ideological war that 
knowns no state borders. ■
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It requires more  
than military 
engagement to 
persuade rebels to lay 
down their arms.
